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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been 
gaining tremendous research attention the last few years as they 
support a broad range of applications in the context of the 
Internet of Things. WSN-driven applications greatly depend on 
the sensors’ observations to support decision-making and 
respond accordingly to reported critical events. In case of 
compromisation, it is vital to recover compromised WSN services 
and continue to operate as expected. To achieve an effective 
restoration of compromised WSN services, sensors should be 
equipped with the logic to take recovery decisions and self-heal. 
Self-healing is challenging as sensors should be aware of a variety 
of aspects in order to take effective decisions and maximize the 
recovery benefits. So far situation awareness has not been 
actively investigated in an intrusion recovery context. This 
research work formulates situation aware intrusion recovery 
policy design guidelines in order to drive the design of new 
intrusion recovery solutions that are operated by an adaptable 
policy. An adaptable intrusion recovery policy is presented 
taking into consideration the proposed design guidelines. The 
evaluation results demonstrate that the proposed policy can 
address advanced attack strategies and aid the sensors to recover 
the network’s operation under different attack situations and 
intrusion recovery requirements.  
Keywords—WSN, resilience, persistent adversary, survivability, 
adaptability, intrusion recovery, situation aware intrusion recovery, 
intrusion recovery policy  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have evolved the last 
few years, supporting a broad range of critical infrastructures in 
the context of the Internet of Things (IoT) [1, 2]. WSNs find 
applicability in critical areas such as healthcare, smart grid, 
disaster relief and ambient living. The fact that critical 
operations depend on the sensors’ observations to deliver 
reliable services, makes their protection a high priority. A 
variety of factors can threaten the operation of the sensor 
network, lead to the network’s compromisation and affect the 
decision-making process. Such factors [3] include 
characteristics of the deployment environment, e.g. remote 
deployment location, characteristics of the sensor nodes, e.g. 
available resources and characteristics of the adversary, e.g. 
knowledge and motivation.  
In the case where compromisation occurs, it is crucial for 
the WSN to be able to self-heal, restore compromised services 
and continue operating to support its objectives. Self-healing is 
challenging as it is a continue process that should promote two 
objectives; restore what is has been compromised and also 
prohibit malicious nodes from compromising again restored 
operations [4]. A variety of intrusion recovery solutions have 
been proposed in WSNs [5-12] assuming a casual adversary 
that will not persist with his/her attack strategy. These solutions 
are not adequate to address the new challenges that emerge as 
adversaries are getting more experienced and determined to 
succeed in their compromisation attempts. Intelligent 
adversaries have the appropriate knowledge to execute an 
advanced attack strategy to work around defenses. Therefore, 
the tasks of recovering and maintaining a level of operability 
during attack execution, in the context of persistent adversaries, 
become challenging. 
Sensors should be equipped with the logic to respond in a 
prompt way to compromisation attempts in an effort to restore 
the operations that have been affected. In order to promote such 
a logic, sensors should be aware of the situation so they can 
respond accordingly. In the context of intrusion recovery, 
situation awareness [13] is required on different aspects that 
will drive sensors’ recovery attempts. Sensors should be aware 
of the application’s security priorities, of how an attack 
situation evolves, of the intrusion recovery actions that can be 
applied to address the attack strategy and of how the attack and 
recovery strategies can impact the sensors’ operation. In order 
to promote a self-healing capability, an appropriate situation 
aware intrusion recover policy should be designed, taking into 
consideration all the aforementioned aspects that formulate the 
situation that the WSN needs to handle. 
Situation awareness in the context of intrusion recovery has 
not been actively investigated by the research community. This 
research work formulates the situation awareness aspects that 
need to be considered in relation to intrusion recovery and 
contributes situation aware intrusion recovery policy design 
guidelines and an applicable policy. The key feature of the 
policy is that it enables the sensors to be aware of the attack 
situation as it evolves and allow them to make recovery 
decisions by been aware of the application’s security 
requirements and of the applicable recovery solutions. Section 
II discusses related work. Section III specifies the aspects that 
should drive the situation awareness process. Section IV 
presents the proposed situation awareness intrusion recovery 
policy design guidelines. Section V demonstrates the 
applicability of the proposed policy design guidelines and 
section VI provides the relevant evaluation analysis. Section 
VII constitutes conclusions.   
 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
A number of security attacks [10, 11] can be executed 
against a WSN in an effort to affect the sensor nodes 
communication capability. Such attacks include the blackhole, 
selective forward, sinkhole, wormhole, eavesdropping and 
denial of service (DoS) attacks. In order for the blackhole and 
selective forward attacks to be effective, the malicious node 
has to be part of the active route path. The key feature of the 
blackhole and selective forward attacks is that the malicious 
node decides whether it will forward a received packet or it 
will discard it, aiming to disrupt the information flow that is 
destined for the destination/control center. Attacks such as 
eavesdropping are less intrusive, as the primary task of a 
malicious node is to overhear communication in order to 
support the malicious intents, e.g. steal packets, identify 
sensors’ presence. A DoS is a highly intrusive attack that can 
be implemented by a malicious node. A typical case of a DoS 
is having a malicious node continuously transmitting packets 
with a high rate in an effort to affect the network’s availability, 
communication and operability.  
Typical solutions that have been proposed as an effort to 
address the blackhole and selective forward attacks include 
blacklisting the malicious node and updating the active route 
paths to exclude the blacklisted nodes and successfully route 
packets to the intended destination, e.g. [5,6]. In the case where 
a non-intrusive attack is considered, such as eavesdropping, it 
is challenging to detect and address it. With regards to a DoS 
attack, the WSN can implement a low duty cycle [7] or a 
channel surfing strategy [8,9]. In the context of the intrusion 
recovery solutions that have been proposed so far in WSNs, 
e.g. [5-12], a single type of a security attack is mainly 
addressed. This means that the proposed solutions cannot 
effectively address an attacker that adapts his intrusion attack 
strategy after recovery measures have been applied. An 
adaptable attack strategy is a challenging feature to address and 
requires adaptability to be applied by the intrusion recovery 
strategy implemented by the WSN. Such a feature can be 
promoted by an appropriate security policy that will guide 
sensors to react based on different conditions. With regards to 
security policies in WSNs, designs have mostly focused on 
prevention aspects [14-17]. 
III. SITUATION AWARENESS IN AN INTRUSION RECOVERY 
CONTEXT 
In order to incorporate situation awareness into intrusion 
recovery solutions, knowledge is required on three main 
directions as depicted in Fig.1: 
- Attack situation. This includes the type of the executed 
attack, its frequency and also a plausible attack strategy 
that is relevant to the WSN operation. 
- Intrusion recovery situation. This includes what 
countermeasures are applicable under specific attack 
conditions. Also, the advantages and disadvantages of 
the available intrusion recovery countermeasures 
should be considered in an effort to select the 
appropriate solution that can maximize the recovery 
benefits.     
- Intrusion recovery priorities. The intrusion recovery 
requirements that can be promoted by each solution 
should be considered and prioritized based on the 
application’s needs. Different applications may require 
to promote specific intrusion recovery benefits and 
therefore the intrusion recovery strategy should be 
adapted accordingly. 
The sensor network should be aware of the aforementioned 
directions in order to decide on the intrusion recovery 
actions that should be applied based on the current 
situation. 
 
Fig. 1: Situation awareness directions 
IV. SITUATION AWARE INTRUSION RECOVERY POLICY 
DESIGN 
This section investigates the aspects that formulate a 
situation awareness intrusion recover process and proposes 
intrusion recovery policy design guidelines. The new design 
approach is driven by a number of activities that drive the 
intrusion recovery decision making. The decision making 
process can be used by the research community to formulate 
new recovery solutions in WSNs. Fig. 2 presents the proposed 
activities. 
 
Fig. 2: Situation aware decision making activities 
A. Assets Identification 
In order to formulate an effective situation aware intrusion 
recovery policy, the assets that need to be recovered in case of 
compromisation should be clearly specified. The main assets 
that are of great value in a WSN are the sensed data and the 
energy source. WSN-driven applications rely on the sensed 
data to support their services and the decision-making process. 
For example, if observations regarding a critical event, e.g. fire, 
are reported by the sensor network to a control center, an 
appropriate decision is taken such as sending a response team 
to mitigate the fire. To be able to relay data to the control 
center, sensors have to be available to communicate. 
Communication is greatly dependent on the energy source and 
on the sensors’ ability to access the wireless channel to 
transmit/receive data. Batteries are often utilized by sensors as 
their main energy source, therefore if battery depletion occurs, 
this will lead to the sensors’ unavailability. Moreover, if the 
sensors are prohibited from accessing the wireless channel, e.g. 
due to on-going communication in their vicinity, this can stall 
the control center from been informed of a critical event that 
occurred. Therefore, the communication capability of the 
sensors should also be considered as an asset that needs to be 
recovered in case of compromisation. Without this capability, 
the sensor network will not be in position to propagate its 
observations and support decision-making.  
By being aware of the main assets that need to be recovered 
in case of compromisation, appropriate intrusion recovery 
solutions can be formulated. Based on the assets that have been 
specified, sensors should be able to recover from attacks that 
target the battery’s depletion in an effort to make them 
unavailable. Moreover, they should apply recover actions to 
recover from attacks that affect their packet delivery capability.  
B. Intrusion Recovery Expectations 
As soon as the main assets that are of value of the WSN-
driven application are specified, the intrusion recovery 
expectations of the solution to be designed should be 
considered. The expectations should be identified in the context 
of the network’s operation and then drive the specification of 
appropriate security requirements that should be achieved 
through the proposed solutions. It is important to realize that 
different applications may focus on recovering different 
security requirements, therefore, prioritizing them based on the 
applications’ objectives is an element that should be part of the 
situation awareness process.  
The principle expectation should be to recover the 
network’s operation in case of compromisation. Taking into 
consideration that a WSN is often implemented in remote 
locations where human intervention cannot be easily and/or 
promptly applied, it would be beneficial if sensors could self-
heal. A self-healing capability will allow sensors to respond 
promptly to compromisation and potentially minimize the 
attack surface, thus minimizing the negative consequences on 
the network’s operation. In order to self-heal, sensors should be 
able to adapt their decisions based on the priorities set on the 
security requirements that should be achieved. In an intrusion 
recovery context, self-healingness can be supported by the 
following security requirements: 
- Survivability. This refers to the ability of nodes to 
remain alive after a security attack has been launched 
and to continue functioning, supporting the 
fundamental WSN services. This can be achieved if the 
energy consumption that occurs due to the attacks can 
be minimized and/or eliminated. 
- Reliability. Intrusion recovery should promote a 
reliable network operation, meaning that packet 
delivery capability should be successfully restored 
after a compromisation in order to allow data to be 
delivered to the destination. 
- Resilience. Once intrusion recovery countermeasures 
are applied and the network’s operation is restored, it is 
essential to be able to resist new attacks that aim to 
interrupt the recovered WSN’s services. 
C. Threat Profiling 
In the quest of designing a situation aware intrusion 
recovery solution, it is necessary to specify the threat that the 
WSN would be expected to deal with. Profiling the threat 
should aim in understanding the adversary’s intent, 
opportunities and capabilities.  
An adversary can be characterized as internal if he is able 
to compromise sensors and turn them malicious or if he can 
insert his own malicious nodes that can be conceived as part of 
the network. If he is not able to participate in the network, he is 
perceived as an external threat. Internal attackers are by far 
more dangerous as they can be included in routing paths, thus 
they may affect the network’s communication as they are 
supposed to forward packets to the next hop. Also they have 
direct access to neighboring nodes’ observations. Furthermore, 
an attacker can be characterized as casual or persistent based 
on his compromisation objectives. A casual attacker is a person 
who has basic programming skills and knowledge to execute a 
single attack. His compromisation objectives are assumed to be 
superficial and mainly focus on testing his capabilities. 
Therefore, in this case the attacker does not have strong 
motivations to damage the network. In the case where the 
network recovers, a casual attacker is not expected to continue 
with new compromisation efforts. However, a persistent 
attacker is expected not to be discouraged by the intrusion 
recovery actions that are applied by sensors. His motivation is 
to prohibit sensors from propagating critical observations to a 
control center so that reliable decision-making cannot be made. 
A persistent adversary has excellent knowledge of how 
protocols and technologies work and he is capable of adapting 
his intrusion strategy while the network recovers. Such an 
attacker poses a great threat to the network. In the case where a 
persistent attacker gets access in the network, recovery 
becomes even more challenging.  
D. Plausible Attack Strategy 
Sensors should be aware of the attack situation and self-
heal accordingly. This means that sensors should have 
knowledge about the attacks that can occur so they can decide 
on the appropriate countermeasure(s) that should be applied. 
The attacks that should be considered, need to be relevant to 
the assets that have been identified as important and need to be 
recovered in case of compromisation. Based on the assets that 
have been specified at section A, potential attacks that can be 
part of an adversary’s strategy include the selective forward, 
blackhole, sinkhole, wormhole, denial of service (DoS) and 
eavesdropping. Energy consumption can be greatly affected by 
a DoS attack and make sensors unavailable. Packet delivery is 
degraded with the selective forward, blackhole, sinkhole, 
wormhole and DoS as well. If a number of sensors cannot 
communicate due to energy depletion, this can affect the 
network communication. With eavesdropping, a malicious 
node can perform reconnaissance activities in an effort to 
identify if there are near-by sensors. A variety of attack 
strategies can be formulated, based on the selected combination 
of attacks. This needs to be taken into consideration when 
investigating potential recovery strategies in an effort to 
consider relevant and effective recovery countermeasures. 
Depending on whether the malicious nodes are considered an 
external or an internal threat as discussed at section C, specific 
attacks can be executed as depicted in Fig.3: 
 
Fig. 3: Attacks categorization based on attacker’s profile 
E. Intrusion Recovery Profiling 
Taking into consideration the attacks that may be included 
in the attacker’s strategy, the relevant intrusion recovery 
countermeasures should be applied by the sensor nodes. 
Sensors can apply existing countermeasures, in addition to new 
intrusion recovery solutions that can be designed. Currently, 
the following intrusion recovery solutions have been identified: 
- Blacklisting and rerouting. This is the typical and 
simplest recovery countermeasure. Sensor nodes 
blacklist detected malicious nodes and do not accept or 
forward any kind of communication from/to nodes 
listed in the blacklisting cache. They update affected 
route paths to exclude the participation of detected 
malicious nodes. 
- Low duty cycle. Sensor nodes utilize a low duty cycle 
to go to sleep in an effort to address the DoS attack and 
protect their energy source from depletion. However, 
this approach may affect the network’s packet delivery 
capability and decision-making since nodes are turned 
unavailable during the low duty cycle countermeasure. 
- Channel surfing. At the deployment phase or during 
runtime, sensors are configured to use a specific 
frequency to communicate. If an attack is detected, 
sensors switch to a new frequency in an effort to 
isolate the malicious nodes and turn the attacks 
ineffective. 
- Multipath routing. Redundant paths are calculated in 
advance so they can be utilized when an attack is 
detected. Initially, a single path is utilized and once 
malicious activity is detected the routing turns into 
multipath in order to recover compromised WSN 
services. 
Fig. 4 maps the intrusion recovery countermeasures, that can 
be considered by future intrusion recovery policy designs, to 
the relevant attacks that can be addressed. 
 
Fig. 4: Attacks and relevant intrusion recovery countermeasures 
F.  Situation Aware Intrusion Recovery Decision Making 
Sensors should hold the decision making engine in order to 
select and apply recovery actions depending on the situation in 
terms of the attack execution, the persistency of the malicious 
nodes, the available recovery countermeasures and their 
benefits, and the application’s security priorities. As the attack 
situation evolves, sensors should adapt accordingly taking into 
consideration the aforementioned information. Fig. 5 
categorizes countermeasures based on the attack that can be 
addressed and based on the intrusion recovery requirements 
that can be promoted. This classification should drive the 
intrusion recovery decision-making process.  
As it can be observed from Fig. 5, there may be more than 
one countermeasure mapped to a specific attack. Also, a 
specific countermeasure may address more than one intrusion 
recovery requirement. The decision on which countermeasure 
should be implemented should be based on conditions set by 
the designer of the solution in an effort to maximize the 
recovery benefits and minimize the attack window. This means 
that the designer should have a good understanding of how a 
countermeasure works and of its strong and weak operational 
features.  
Fig. 6 presents the decision making flowchart that should 
drive the operation of the situation awareness intrusion 
 Fig. 5: Intrusion recovery requirements, attacks and countermeasures 
 
Fig. 6: Intrusion recovery decision making flowchart 
recovery policy. The decision making process first considers 
the security priority set by the policy designer. The security 
priority is the driving factor of the recovery countermeasures to 
be applied. As discussed in section B, the intrusion recovery 
expectations should consider restoring the survivability, 
reliability and/or resilience of sensors in case of 
compromisation. Policy designers should initially select a 
security priority (survivability, reliability, resilience) to drive 
the decision making process. As soon as an attack is detected 
by the sensor network, its type is considered by the sensors so 
that the relevant countermeasure could be applied. As 
discussed in section E, each recovery countermeasure has 
specific operational features that the policy designer should be 
aware of in an effort to promote the selected security priority.  
Depending on the application’s objectives, the detected 
attack, the attacker’s profile and the characteristics (strengths, 
weaknesses) of the relevant intrusion recovery 
countermeasures, the application’s security priority may need 
to change as attacks evolve. In order to update the security 
priority, appropriate security conditions need to be specified 
considering the aforementioned elements. The rationale of the 
need to update the security priority comes from the realization 
that as an attack evolves, an application may need to focus on 
the recovery of different operability aspects (compared to the 
initial selected security priority) that have been compromised 
by the attack. For example, initially a WSN application may 
focus on recovering the reliability of the network. However, as 
attacks get more persistent, greatly affecting the network’s 
operability, recovering the network’s survivability may be 
more important, thus it should become the primary objective. 
This means that adaptability of recovery will be promoted to 
deal with different attack situations.  
The fact that more than one options, in terms of intrusion 
recovery countermeasures, might exist in order to address a 
specific attack is both challenging but also beneficial for the 
network as it can support a diverse recovery approach. 
Selecting an appropriate intrusion recovery countermeasure to 
address an attack is challenging as sensors need to be equipped 
with the logic to select a solution. This logic can be established 
if sensors are aware of the following information: a) a mapping 
between attacks and countermeasures (as presented in Fig. 5) 
and b) what countermeasure to select in case there is more than 
one option. The security conditions that are mentioned earlier 
should guide the sensors as to the selection that should be 
made.  
The proposed situation awareness intrusion recovery 
process, that is presented in section IV, can be easily extended 
to support more security requirements, security attacks and 
relevant countermeasures, if required by the WSN application. 
If such a case occurs, the proposed process will still be utilized 
in the same way, the difference is that more options will exist 
under the proposed situation aware intrusion recovery 
activities. The following section presents a case study to 
demonstrate how the proposed intrusion recovery design 
guidelines can be utilized.     
V. CASE STUDY SCENARIO 
An appropriate situation aware intrusion recovery policy 
has been formulated, taking into consideration the proposed 
design guidelines. A critical WSN-driven application is 
considered, where a persistent adversary is able to compromise 
existing sensors and turn them malicious. Therefore, he has 
become an internal threat that aims to affect the network’s 
packet delivery capability and to deplete the sensors’ batteries. 
Initially, the network’s security priority is set as to recover the 
reliability in case of compromisation. The following conditions 
have been specified: 
If selective forward attack detected & persistent adversary 
assumed -> update security priority to survivability and set low 
duty cycle as the applicable recovery action against a DoS    
                                                                   (condition 1) 
If DoS attack detected & low duty cycle previously applied 
& attack frequency continuous -> update security priority to 
reliability and set channel surfing as the applicable recovery 
action against a DoS    (condition 2) 
If DoS attack detected & channel surfing previously applied 
& attack frequency continuous -> update security priority to 
survivability and set low duty cycle as the applicable recovery 
action against a DoS    (condition 3) 
The rationale of the specified conditions is that a persistent 
adversary would like to postpone the attack detection, therefore 
he may try to initially implement attacks such as the selective 
forward. The malicious nodes that implement the attack may be 
perceived as malfunctioned nodes and therefore stall the 
attack’s detection. In the case that such an attack is detected, 
the sensors blacklist the malicious nodes and update the active 
route paths to exclude them from the communication. This is 
the only solution for the relevant attack that has been 
considered by the case study recovery policy. Multipath is 
considered to require a more complicate approach, i.e. discover 
and maintain multiple routing paths, and is not considered to be 
part of the policy at the moment.  Since a persistent adversary 
is assumed, it is anticipated that he will move forward to 
execute a more active attack, such as a DoS, in an effort to 
deplete the energy sources and continue compromising the 
network’s operation. In such a case, the recovery priority is 
updated to survivability. It is also considered that the low duty 
cycle affects the packet delivery capability of the network. 
Therefore, if the adversary insists with his attack strategy, the 
network will focus again on recovering reliability and thus 
deploy a channel surfing countermeasure in an effort for 
observations to reach the intended destination. However, in the 
case where the adversary is able to identify the new frequency 
and continue with the attack, the priority should be to protect 
the network’s energy sources. Taking into consideration the 
recovery benefits of the relevant countermeasures, the low duty 
cycle should be applied in an effort to prolong the network’s 
lifetime. The following section demonstrates through ns2 
simulations the effectiveness of the intrusion recovery policy 
by empowering sensors with a self-healing capability.    
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
The evaluation is performed using the ns2 simulator. The 
simulation scenario considers an IEEE 802.15.4 network, 
consisting of sensor nodes that are equipped with an omni-
directional antenna. Sender nodes generate constant bit rate 
(CBR) traffic with a rate of 2 packets per second and a packet 
size of 70 bytes, following reactive routing, under the 
assumption of a detected event. A dense (550x550m) and a 
sparse (750x750m) network topology have been specified, 
consisting of 100 nodes each. Moreover, 5% and 10% 
randomly selected malicious nodes are considered. Initial 
energy is 100 Joules. Power consumption is based on a 
CC2400 WSN transceiver and LOS radio conditions are 
considered. Each experiment is repeated 30 times and the 
presented results have been averaged over the set of the 30 
simulation runs. More details can be found in [4]. 
Based on the security priorities set in section V, the 
network’s performance in terms of packet delivery and energy 
consumption will be investigated [18]. The rationale of the 
investigations is that the WSN operability can be recovered, 
assuming a persistent adversary, if the packer delivery can be 
restored and the energy consumption due to the attacks can be 
kept low. A reliable decision making can be made if the packet 
delivery is recovered. Moreover, the network’s survivability 
can be maintained if the energy consumption is decreased. 
A normal network operation is first simulated in order to 
serve as a reference point for the rest of the simulated 
scenarios. A percentage of 85.7% packet delivery is achieved 
by the sparse topology while the dense topology presents a 
74.6%. The dense topology demonstrates a lower packet 
delivery capability due to a higher number of collisions and 
packet drops that occur due to the higher node density. Based 
on the case study scenario presented in section V, the malicious 
nodes execute a selective forward attack, affecting the 
operability of the network. The attack’s outcome varies 
depending on a number of factors, such as the location of the 
malicious nodes towards the active packet flow, the number of 
malicious nodes and the density of the network. As Fig. 7 
demonstrates, the packet delivery decreases as the number of 
malicious nodes in the network increases. As the number of 
malicious nodes increases, this means that they have more 
chances to be selected to participate in routing and therefore 
affect more active route paths. The packet delivery is decreased 
up to 33.6% and up to 19.6% in the sparse and dense 
topologies respectively when considering 10% malicious 
nodes. As it is observed, the selective forward attack is more 
effective in the case of the sparse topology. The packet delivery 
is about 14% less in the sparse topology compared to the dense 
one, when considering 10% malicious nodes. This occurs as 
the opportunities of a malicious node to be selected in routing 
paths decrease as the network’s density increases. Therefore, a 
malicious node affects less the network’s ability to propagate 
observations to the destination. Moreover, the energy 
consumption (Fig. 8) is decreased since there are less packets 
propagated in the network. The sparse topology demonstrates 
up to 12% less energy consumption than the dense topology.  
The sensor network monitors its operation in order to 
identify malicious activities. When the selective forward attack 
is detected, the appropriate countermeasure is deployed. 
According to the case study scenario, sensor nodes blacklist the 
malicious nodes and update the routing paths to exclude them 
from the communication in order to address the selective 
forward attack. As indicated in Fig. 7, the network 
demonstrates a higher ability to increase its packet delivery as 
more active malicious nodes are detected and excluded from 
the route paths. The sparse topology presents a higher increase 
percentage (Fig. 9 and 10), up to 31.8%, compared to the dense 
topology that goes up to 10.3%. As previously mentioned, in 
the dense topology malicious nodes have fewer chances to 
route packets compared to the sparse topology. However, as 
the network applies recovery measures and updates routing 
paths, undetected malicious nodes in the dense topology 
increase their chance to route packets. Therefore, while the 
dense network excludes previously detected malicious nodes 
from the communication and tries to recover, the updated 
routing paths continue to be affected by the undetected 
malicious nodes that are now selected to forward observations 
to the destination.  
As soon as the sensors apply the recovery measures, the 
selective forward attack becomes ineffective as the malicious 
nodes are excluded from the communication. This does not 
mean that sensors should be at rest, as the malicious nodes can 
deploy further attacks in an effort to compromise the recovered 
network operation. The malicious nodes enter a promiscuous 
mode and they execute a DoS attack, per overhearing case, by 
continuously sending route control packets. The DoS attack is 
more effective in the dense network that demonstrates a 
decrease of packet delivery up to 33% compared to up to 26% 
decrease that occurs in the sparse network when 10% malicious 
nodes are considered. This occurs as the dense network 
provides more opportunities to malicious nodes to overhear 
communication, thus more malicious nodes initiate the DoS 
attack compared to the sparse case, affecting more neighboring 
nodes. The attack greatly affects the network’s performance as 
a high number of packet drops and retransmissions occurs, 
triggering the route path maintenance procedure a number of 
times. This leads to increased energy consumption.  
The malicious nodes can maximize the attack’s outcome by 
executing the DoS attack, regardless whether they can overhear 
communication or not. In such a case, the malicious activities 
are more effective in the sparse topology. In terms of packet 
delivery, the sparse network presents a 5% decrease, compared 
to 1% that is observed in the dense topology. The sparse 
topology is affected more compared to the dense case, because 
there are more malicious nodes executing the DoS as 
previously they have been inactive since they weren’t 
overhearing anything. In order to address the DoS attack, the 
network deploys a low duty cycle. Since a number of sensors 
become unavailable due to the low duty cycle, the packet 
delivery capability of the network is decreased. In the dense 
network there are more nodes affected by the attack and 
therefore more nodes implement the low duty cycle compared 
to the sparse topology. The packet delivery (Fig. 9) decreases 
by 22% and by 16% in the case of dense and sparse topologies 
respectively, when considering 5% malicious nodes. 
Furthermore, the impact of the DoS attack is higher in the 
dense network due to the location of the malicious nodes that is 
near active route paths. Therefore, the attack forces the route 
maintenance procedure to be triggered more times in order to 
update the paths. However, establishing new active route paths 
is challenging as a number of nodes are unavailable to 
participate in the update of the active paths, causing a higher 
number of packet loss and retransmissions. It is also observed 
that as the number of malicious nodes increases from 5% to 
10%, the communication capability is greater affected in the 
sparse topology. The low duty cycle does not favor recovery in 
the sparse network, compared to the dense network, as there 
are fewer nodes to consider in the routing process. This makes 
it difficult to establish stable routing paths. As Fig.10 presents, 
the packet delivery is decreased by 30% and by 27% in the 
sparse and dense topology respectively, when considering 10% 
malicious nodes. The low duty cycle measure affects the packet 
delivery, however, it safeguards the energy resources of sensor 
nodes and therefore it still enhances the operability of the 
network by promoting its survivability. The energy 
consumption is decreased by 56% and by 57% in the dense and 
sparse topology, when considering 10% malicious nodes.  
Since a persistent adversary is considered, it is expected 
that the malicious nodes will be persistent with the DoS attack. 
In such a case, sensors can apply the channel surfing solution 
to restore the network’s packet delivery capability. With the 
                                       Fig. 7: Packet delivery 
 
Fig. 8: Energy consumption 
 
Fig. 9: Packet delivery % recovery gain with 5% malicious nodes 
 
         Fig. 10: Packet delivery % recovery gain with 10% malicious nodes 
channel surfing, a different frequency can be utilized by the 
sensors in an effort to leave the malicious nodes operating at 
the default frequency and thus exclude them from the network 
communication. The applicability of the channel surfing is 
more effective in the case of the sparse topology. This occurs 
as sensors can update the frequency and establish stable routing 
paths easier than the dense topology, presenting less packet 
collisions, packet retransmissions and packet loss. Thus, the 
sparse topology decreases energy consumption more, up to 
15% less, compared to the dense network, when considering 
10% malicious nodes. The sparse network favors an increased 
packet delivery capability, up to 31%, that is restored with the 
channel surfing measure. The dense topology presents an 
increase of the packet delivery up to 20.2%. Although sensors 
have applied measures to recover from compromisation, the 
threat still exists since the malicious nodes are present and can 
continue with their compromisation efforts. If the malicious 
nodes cannot eavesdrop any network communication, they scan 
available frequency channels in an effort to identify the 
presence of sensors and continue with the DoS attack. Once 
this occurs, the network performance is degraded once more. 
An overall 48% and 36.5% packet delivery is demonstrated by 
the sparse and dense topologies when considering 10% 
malicious nodes. As a response to the attack, the sensors can 
continue applying the low duty cycle and/or the channel 
surfing measure in order to establish communication over a 
different frequency channel and promote the network’s 
operability. 
As it is demonstrated, it is beneficial for the sensor network 
to deploy a situation aware intrusion recovery policy. The 
assessed policy was designed taking into consideration the 
proposed situation aware intrusion recovery guidelines. It is 
anticipated that a variety of policies can be formulated, taking 
into consideration the diversity in the WSN applications, the 
potential attacker profiles, the potential attacks and 
countermeasures. In order to achieve an effective evaluation, 
appropriate performance metrics need to be considered, driven 
by the security priorities set by the policy designers. The work 
at [18] can be utilized in order to select specific evaluation 
metrics that are proposed to assess security requirements in the 
context of intrusion recovery protocols.   
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The utilization of a situation aware intrusion recovery 
policy can address a persistent adversary that adapts his attack 
strategy as the network applies recovery countermeasures. By 
taking into consideration information such as the attack type, 
the attack frequency, the intrusion recovery priorities and the 
countermeasures characteristics, the intrusion recovery 
decision-making can be accordingly adjusted in an effort to 
maximize the recover benefits and meet the application’s 
intrusion recovery expectations. Designing intrusion recovery 
solutions is challenging, however, if sensors become intrusion 
recovery situation aware they will be able to respond to 
compromisation attempts and selfheal. The situation awareness 
intrusion recovery policy design guidelines constitute the first 
attempt to investigate situation awareness in the context of 
intrusion recovery in WSNs. As a future work, the policy 
guidelines will be further elaborated in order to drive the 
formulation of new intrusion recovery solutions. Moreover, a 
proof-of-concept implementation will be pursued. 
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